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On the Lack of Trade Union Power in 
Kenya 
John S. Henley 
One or two British commentators hâve recently complained of 
the widespread neglect of social structural factors in analyses of indus-
trial relations topics. Hill and Thurley, for example, contend that 
without adéquate attention to social structure the subject is emasculated. 
This is particularly apparent in the field of cross-cultural comparisons.* 
Hyman and Brough warn of the ideological implications of not 
taking into account the wider political economy which shapes spécifie 
national Systems of industrial relations and suggest that too often indus-
trial relations 'problems' are examined from within the perspectives of 
those in positions of political and économie power.2 With respect to 
labour relations in Kenya, it is tempting to either assume that the insti-
tutions of the labour market function in a broadly similar manner to 
those of an industrialised economy or to attack the labour unions for 
participating in an unholy alliance with employers to extort monopoly 
profits from the rural majority of the population. Both approaches 
assume some kind of equilibrium model of labour relations towards 
which Kenya is advancing, even if the current situation is far from a 
balance of power. 
Muir and Brown in their writings on trade union power and 
strike behaviour in Kenya illustrate some of the weaknesses of imputing 
rôles to trade unions, government agencies and employers without first 
locating their respective positions in the political economy.3 To be sure 
they assiduously record the lack of union fînancial resources — $2.87 
per member in 1972 — and the décline in strike activity — from an 
annual average of 211,700 man-days lost for the period 1963-65 down 
to 76,300 man-days lost annualy for the period 1966-72. Yet they fail 
to explain how it is possible for a labour movement with a dues paying 
m e m b e r s h i p o f SOme 4 0 % of the I HENLEY, J. S., Lecturer in Organi- I 
total labour f o r c e to remain p e a c e - sational Behaviour, Department of 
fui. Whi l e their real w a g e s d é c l i n e Business studies, University of Edin-
— 3% in 1973, 6% in 1974 and 8% in I burë- Edmburg, Scotland. | 
1
 Stephan HILL and Keith THURLEY, 'Sociology and Industrial Relations1 
British Journal of Industrial Relations Vol. XII, No. 2, 1974. pp. 147-170. 
2
 Richard HYMAN and Ian BROUGH, «Social Values and Industrial Relations' 
Blackwell,» Oxford, 1975. 
3
 J. Douglas MUIR and John L. BROWN, «Trade Union Power and the Pro-
cess of Economie Development: The Kenyan example» Industrial Relations Industrielles, 
Vol. 29, No. 3, 1974, pp. 474-496. J. Douglas MUIR and John L. BROWN, «Labour 
législation and Industrial Disputes: The Kenyan Case» British Journal of Industrial Re-
lations, Vol. XIII, No. 3, 1975, pp. 334-345. 
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1975.4 Admittedly, there was a brief show of solidarity in 1975 which 
persuaded the government to improve statutory minimum wages and 
civil service pay, but by 8% less than price increases.5 Furthermore, 
labour leaders did not protest when ail strikes were made illégal by 
Presidential Decree in August, 1974. Even in the matter of élection to 
the Central Organisation of Trade Unions and the writing of its consti-
tution, the government holds a veto which it does exercise periodically.6 
While it is entirely reasonable of Muir and Brown7 to conclude that the 
Kenyan labour movement has no choice but to stoically accept restric-
tions on its power, support for this conclusion is not provided by com-
paring the functioning of the Kenyan Industrial Court with those of 
New Zealand and Australia, without attention to Friedrich Fùrstenberg's 
observations in his summing up of the délibérations of Section III of 
IIRA 3rd World Congress. He noted: — 'Potential and actual power 
are not solely derived from factors inhérent in the organisational struc-
ture reflecting a given industrial relations System. They also reflect 
underlying social structures determining the motivation and ability for 
solidaristic action.8 
The other school of thought that favours some form of equilib-
rium model of the inter-relationship between the institutions of industrial 
relations, of course, is that of neoclassical économies. The most récent 
commentary on the Kenyan labour market in this vein is the 1975 
World Bank Report.9 It follows the well established tradition of point-
ing to a positive corrélation between high wages and a unionised labour 
force and drawing the inference — naturally highly qualified but never-
theless stated — that unions hâve, in some unspecified way a causual 
association with firms that pay higher than supply price wages. Such 
analyses usually fail to test whether unionisation represents a proxy 
for the présence of large firms using relatively capital intensive techni-
ques of production with efficiency incentives for paying high wages.10 
4
 Government of Kenya, 'Economie Survey 1975*, Government Printers, Nai-
robi, 1975, p. 45 and an estimate for 1975 by Ministry of Labour, Employmem Promo-
tion Division. 
5
 This consistée! of a threat of a gênerai strike unless the Government increased 
the minimum industrial wage to K.SL 400/- per month from K.SL 250/-. In the event, 
the Président on Ist May 1975 announced an increase to 300/- p.m. 
6
 For example, in the élection of Officers of COTU in 1975, the Président 
chose to ratify the appointment of the loser in the contest for Deputy Secretary General, 
the new constitution for COTU was written in the Attorney General's Chambers in con-
sultation with labour leaders, and the Ministry of Labour has an ex officio représentative 
on COTL's governing Council. 
7
 Ibid. MUIR and BROWN pp. 340-344. 
* Friederick FURSTENBERG 'The Structure of Power in Trade Union Move-
ments" Report of Section / / / , 3rd World Congress of International Industrial Relations 
Association, Geneva, 1973, pp. 15-16. 
y
 World Bank, 'Kenya: Into the Second Décade1 (éd. John Burrows) John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1975 pp. 272-4. 
111
 See G. E. JOHNSON 'The Détermination of Individual Hourly Earnings in 
Urban Kenya' Institute for Development Studies D. P. No. 115, Nairobi, 1971. 
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Récent work on segmentation of the American labour market suggests 
that large monopolistic corporations hâve good économie reasons for 
sharing most productivity increases with employées rather than with 
consumers.11 Why the situation should be any différent in a labour 
surplus economy is not explained.12 
The ideological prédilection of the World Bank Report is clear. 
Muir and Brown are more sympathetic to trade unions but imply they 
are legitimately constrained in the national interest — whatever that may 
be.1 3 Neither approach attempts to relate labour relations to the spécifie 
context of the political economy of contemporary Kenya. 
Crucial to the interprétation of the significance of collective 
bargaining in the détermination of terms and conditions of employment 
is an appréciation of the small size of the industrial labour force in a 
basically agricultural economy. Out of a total population of some 
thirteen million, approximately 610,000 were non-agricultural wage-
earners in 1974. Most of thèse are concentrated in three urban centres, 
about a half of them in the vicinity of the capital alone. This gives 
rise to substantial imbalances in earnings-per-worker between différent 
régions of the country which House attributes to différences of industry 
composition rathern than to intra-industry différences and a conséquence 
of régional concentration of industries (see Table 1).14 
Thèse imbalances in the industrial geography of Kenya are, in 
turn, reflected in variations in proportions of the population who are 
wage earners. For example, in 1970, the ratio of contributors to the 
National Social Security Fund to the dépendent population under 15 
years of âge and over 60 years in Nairobi was 1:12, in Central Province 
it was 1:17 and in Western Province it was 1:128.15 When the ethnicity 
of the contributor is compared with whether the person's place of work 
was in the Province predominantly inhabited by the individual's ethnie 
11
 See Richard C. EDWARDS, Michael REICH and David M. GORDON, 
'Labour Market Segmentation' D. C. Heath, Lexington, Mass. 1975. It is perhaps fairer 
to point out that Michael L. WACHTER, in his paper 'Primary and Secondary Labour 
Markets: A Critique of the Dual Approach' Brookings Papers on Economie Activity, 
3 1974 pp. 637-693, argues that much neo-classical labour market économies is over 
simple and often ignores efficiency considérations of individuel employers but does not 
inherently deny labour market segmentation. 
12
 Ibid, World Bank Report p. 273 T h e disparate earnings for similar skills across 
industries imply that productivity increases are being shared by employer and employée 
rather than employer and consumer, as would normally be expected in a labour surplus 
economy'. 
'* Ibid, MUIR and BROWN p. 493. 
14
 William J. HOUSE 'Earnings-per-Worker Differentials in the Provinces of 
Kenya, 1963-1970', Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 9 No. 3, 1975, p. 359-376. 
15
 The data relating to contributions to the National Social Security Fund for 
1970 is drawn from an unpublished M. A. Thesis by the current Director, A. D. MUYA 
University of Nairobi, 1974, pp. 126 & 131, Ail full-time, permanent employées are sup-
posed to be members of the Fund. 
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group, the analysis suggests the extent of migration engendered by 
imbalances in the distribution of wage employment. 
Only ten per cent of Luhya contributors worked in Western 
Province, nineteen per cent of the Kamba, Meru and Embu in Eastern 
Province, twenty-three per cent of the Luo, Kisii and Kuria in Nyanza 
and forty per cent of the Kikuyu in Central Province. Averaged over 
the total population there were fourteen persons under 15 years of âge 
or over 60 years for every person in sufficiently formai wag employ-
ment to be contributing to the National Social Security Fund. 
Industry is highly monopolistic in its structure as evidenced 
by a significant positive relationship between average industrial gross 
price-cost margins and monopoly power as measured by concentration.16 
Perhaps surprisingly, given the government's policy of encouraging 
import 'reproduction', there does not seem to be any discernible in-
dependent influence of the capital requirements of entry into the econ-
omy, on price-cost margins. No doubt there are other non-economic 
barriers to entry.17 
In summary, there is évidence to suggest that the participants 
in formai employment are an 'aristocracy' in the sensé of a small mi-
nority but that they are also vulnérable to concerted employer or govern-
ment action. In the next section we will explore the social-structural 
and political factors that contribute to the weakness of organised labour 
and which cast doubt on the assumption that unions hâve a significant 
rôle in collective bargaining in Kenya. 
ORIENTATIONS TO WORK 
Historically, employment relationships in Kenya hâve been 
highly instrumental in nature and based on differential access to better 
jobs depending on race. Above ail, formai work organisations were 
introduced by a dominant minority whose techniques of labour manage-
ment, at least initially, relied on coercion as much as persuasion and 
économie incentives. 
While the Western superstructure of business and administra-
tion was progressively imposed on the medley of people that were 
living side by side, but separately, in pre-colonial Kenya, each ethnie 
group was encouraged to sustain its own language and culture. Accord-
ing to Furnival, in colonial society, even the worship of Mamon, the 
sole common deity, does not create consensus. For him, the typical 
plural society based on a racial hierarchy and ethnie diversity is a 
16
 William J. HOUSE, 'Market Structure and Industry Performance: The Case 
of Kenya' Oxford Economie Papers. November 1973. William J. HOUSE, 'Market Struc-
ture and Industry Performance: The Case of Kenya Revisited1 in press, 1976. 
17
 See Colin LEYS, 'Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of 
Neo-Colonialism', University of'Californie! Press, 1974. 
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Structural Features of Kenya's Provinces 
O 
H (Percentag e Distribution) 70 
> 
AU Provinces Each Province m 
G 
Modem Sector Wage Modem Sector Modem Sector Wage [O
IM
 
Province Population, 1969 Employment, 1970 Agriculture, 1970 Employment, 1969 Urban Population Z 
(1) (2) (3) (4)a (5)b o 3 
Nairobi 5 25 3 100 100 
E
R
l 
Central 15 15 49 72 3 Z 
Nyanza 19 7 18 55 2 
Western 12 3 18 30 1 Z 
Coast 9 13 13 85 30 > 
Rift Valley 20 29 63 83 7 
Eastern 17 6 27 32 2 
North-Eastern 2 1 0 100 0 
Kenya 100 100 32 71 10 
Source: Kenya Population Census, 1969 (Nairobi: Ministry of Finance and Economie Planning, Statistics 
Division, 1971), vol. 2, and unpublished ministry data. 
a Wage employment no in the modem sector is defined to be in nonagricultural rural enterprises and small-scale 
farms. 
b People living in a town of more than 2,000. 
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business partnership held together by the colonial power. Above ail, 
it has no common will.18 
By the 1950's, there was a marked contrast in officiai policies 
towards rural labour employed in plantation agriculture19 and towards 
urban labour employed in industry and the public service.20 The old 
coercive style was still defended by farming interests while urban 
employers argued for a new corporatist approach to encourage stabilisa-
tion of the labour force and to improve discipline through better wages 
and fringe benefits. This it was hoped would allow workers to sever 
their rural connections by bringing their families from the 'réserves' 
to live permanently in the towns and to become fully committed indus-
trial workers. Undoubtedly the change in officiai policy was infiuenced 
by the Mau Mau Revolt and employers' désire to undermine any effort 
to mobilise workers' discontent behind the struggle for independence. 
Another factor was the change in colonial policy towards encouraging 
an expansion of manufacturing industry based on the importation of 
TABLE 2 
Kenyan Earnings-per-Worker Relatives in Modem Sector Employment 
and Weighted Coefficients of Variation (V of Earnings-
per-Worker Relatives by Province) 1963-70 
Province 1963 1964 7965 7966 7967 1968 1969 a 7970 
Nairobi 175 181 187 184 192 185 181 (238) 172 
Central 71 68 67 58 53 58 61 (66) 66 
Nyanza 63 65 70 77 63 68 69 !58) 85 
Western 85 81 80 83 68 79 85 (46) 85 
Coast 121 117 112 121 120 120 124 (145) 130 
Rift Valley 57 54 52 51 48 49 52 (60) 54 
Eastern 69 67 64 67 56 66 66 (43) 66 
North-Eastern 88 78 88 117 86 94 92 (121) 89 
Kenya 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 (100) 100 
100 
Vw(%) 48.5 51.7 54.6 54.6 60.6 56.2 53.1 (72.3) 47.9 
Source: Kenya Employment and Earnings 1963-1967 (Nairobi: Ministry of Finance 
and Economie Planning, Statistics Division, 1971), app. tables A. 12, A. 13, A. 21, A. 22, 
and for the years 1968-70, unpublished ministry data. 
a Figures in parenthèses dénote earnings-per-worker relatives in total regular wage 
employment, which includes the modem sector and nonagricultural rural enterprises and 
small-scale farms. 
18
 J. S. FURNIVALL, «Colonial Policy and Practice» Cambridge University 
Press,, London 1948, p. 307ff. 
19
 See Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 'Report of the Rural Wages Committee' 
Nairobi, 1955. 
20
 See Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 'Report of the Committee on African 
Wages' Nairobi, 1955. 
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new capital and managerial skills by subsidiaries of multi-national 
companies.21 
The gênerai improvement in modem sector wages from the end 
of the colonial period through independence until the onset of the écon-
omie problems, beginning in 1972, with the collapse of the Ugandan 
market in the wake of Président Amin's 'économie war', has certainly 
had a marked impact on the stability of the labour force. A survey of 
37 manufacturing concerns in 1972, in Nairobi, revealed an average 
labour turnover of only 11.2% from ail causes of the permanent labour 
force in the preceding twelve months.22 Yet inspite of the réduction in 
turnover, there is little évidence to support the view that urban workers 
hâve eut their rural connections. Several studies testify to the strength 
of continuing links.23 Weisner concluded that the most useful way of 
looking at typical families of town dwellers in Nairobi was to view 
them as «One family units, often extended in form with two or more 
households, one in Nairobi; and one on a rural farm».24 
The rural-urban connection is two way, in that the urban worker 
needs to maintain the link for his own beneflt but also other members 
of the family will not let him forget his obligations to them. Retaining 
a landholding in the rural community of one's birth, quite apart from 
feelings of sentiment, is about the only security a worker holds against 
dismissal or retirement. For the majority of workers, it also provides 
a valuable supplément to the family income and a cheap place to bring 
up children away from overcrowded urban areas.25 As a conséquence 
of the small number of modem sector jobs, every person who is for-
21
 Alice H. AMSDEN, 'International Firms and Labour in Kenya 1945-70', F. 
Cass, London 1971. 
22
 Shyam B. L. N1GAM and Stig ACKLUND, «Labour Turnover and Overtime 
Working in Kenya», I.L.O. unpublished, 1972. 
23
 Walker ELKAN 'Is a Prolétariat Emerging in Nairobi?' Institute for Deve-
lopment Studies, D. P. No 168 Nairobi 1973. In a study of supervisors in the Nyanza 
sugar belt of Western Kenya, it was found that only four out of a sample of forty-two 
supervisors did not own land and hâve at least part of their immédiate family living on 
it, inspite of being provided with free company housing. (John S. HENLEY and Francis 
C. ODIT 'The Rural-Industrial Interface: A Study of Emerging Occupational Conscious-
ness of Supervisors in a Nyanza Sugar Refinery' Vierteljanresberichte-Probleme der 
Entwicklungslànder No. 59, 1975, pp. 49-62.) 
24
 Tom S. WEISNER 'One-Family-Two-Households: A Rural Urban Network, 
Model of Urbanism' University of East Africa Social Science Council 5th Annual Con-
férence, Nairobi, 1969, p. 1016. 
25
 Using the same method of calculation adopted by the 1955 Committee on 
African Wages, A. D. MUYA (Ibid, pp. 93-98) estimâtes that at 1970 priées, the basic 
minimum wage for a family unit should be K.Sh. 337 per month in Nairobi. The statutory 
minimum wage in 1970 was K.Sh. 200 per month. He quotes a survey of 1950 by the East 
under-estimated average food consumption and that K.Sh. 430 would represent a more 
under-estimated average food consumption and that K. S. 430 would represent a more 
accurate monthly minimum family wage. Average earnings in manufacturing industry 
was K.Sh. 315 per month for unskilled employées and K.Sh. 669 for ail employées in 1970. 
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tunate enough to hâve a regular cash income is subject to endless 
demands from relatives. While the majority of Kenyan peasants are able 
to feed themselves, the spread of the cash economy into the country-
side has generated an insatiable demand for money, particularly for 
school fées.26 Some fragmentary évidence suggests that a dispropor-
tionate number of first born sons hâve enterred formai sector employ-
ment which probably adds a futher twist to obligations to the extended 
family.27 
The underlying économie factors that force the rural population, 
who hâve relatives in formai sector employment, to make demands on 
them are graphically illustrated by the World Bank Report on Kenya. 
It estimâtes that présent government policies resuit in manufacturing 
industry being subjected to an implicit subsidy of twenty-two per 
cent extracted from the agricultural sector of the economy. The implicit 
rate of subsidy to expatriated profits rises to a staggering fifty-two per 
cent. The Report comments on the transfer effects as follows: — 
«Since taxation of agriculture reduces the income of the poorest 
people, the process involves a transfer from the relatively poor to the 
rich and leads to a further widening in income distribution between 
urban areas What is observed is a System of multiple exchange rates 
the effects of which are to benefit the foreign capitalist most, then the 
local capitalist, then the wage earner in manufacturing, ail at the expense 
of agricultural producers. »28 
In summary, the économie System and a work force primarily 
made up of first génération employées — from unskilled labour to 
directors — typically leads to a highly calculative attitude to work. 
Heavy monetary demands on income, the alien, historically coercive 
origins of work organisations and the absence of any established auton-
omous occupational culture encourage employées to perceive work as 
an opportunity for advancement as much in the world outside work 
as inside the organisation.29 
At the lowest levels, a regular income enables the ordinary worker, 
albeit at a very modest level, to sponsor other members of the family 
and so engender feelings of obligation in the récipients. As income and 
status rises so does the possible scope for patronage and — in par-
allel — the network of applicants. Private urban homes of managers 
and workers alike are constantly visited by people from 'home' or by 
26
 Our study of supervisors suggested they spend between 8-15% of their annual 
income on school fées for their own children and other dependents (Ibid. HENLEY and 
ODITp. 51). 
27
 Michael J. GREAVES reports 46% of his sample of 179 Kenyan managers 
were the oldest boy in their family. (Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, in préparation, Edin-
burgh) In our study, 40% of supervisors were so placed, Ibid HENLEY and ODIT p. 51. 
28
 Op. cit., World Bank pp. 282-3. 
29
 See Terence JOHNSON 'Imperialism and the Professions: Notes on the De-
velopment of Professional Occupations in Britain's Colonies and New States' lnstitute 
of Commonwealîh Studies, University of London, (MIMEO) for a fuller discussion. 
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referrals from other friends asking for one kind of assistance or another. 
Since the town dweller also is usually a country dweller, it is difficult 
to refuse help without risking 'loss of face' in the rural 'home'. 
A conséquence of the prevalence of instrumental attitudes to 
work is the lack of any moral committment to organisations and a 
reluctance on the part of managers to deliberately foster such attitudes. 
For example the provision of company welfare benefits are often ri-
gorously policed for malingerers using médical personnel, a practice 
hardly designed to develop any kind of 'life time committment'. Yet 
the degree and consistency of application required of industrial workers 
cannot be guaranteed by overtly coercive managerial control. While 
fear of the économie and social conséquences of dismissal may encour-
age servile acquiescence, it does not promote initiative or innovation. 
Obviously, simple technology requiring little in the way of skilled 
workmanship can be controlled effectively using authoritarian personal 
supervision. However, where technology becomes more complex or 
where management cadres are dominated by expatriâtes schooled in 
more indulgent styles, bureaucratization is more effective for regulating 
social relations of production. Authority is converted into impersonal 
rules as much as possible resolving the dilemma of the manager or 
supervisor faced with the problem of reconciling the highly structured 
and routinised demands of the modem factory System with traditional 
emphasis on social cohésion and avoidance of conflict learnt in the 
village communities of his and his subordinates' childhood. By stressing 
the rules, the superior can avoid feeling personally responsible for his 
actions appearing impersonal, therefore arbitary and authoritarian, to 
his subordinates. By learning the rules, workers can also acquire a 
certain limited amount of independence within the rules and so escape 
from the most direct dependence relationship inhérent in control by 
Personal supervision.30 
Bureaucratisation of the system of managerial control avoids the 
problem of face-to-face dependence relationships across racial and 
ethnie cleavages, yet protects the rationality of collective action. By 
following the rules, a manager does not threaten the security of his 
subordinates but, by acting impersonally, he fails to share his priveleges 
with his friends and relatives. His own security dépends on his superior's 
behaviour and 'bon plaisir'31 but, unlike in France, peer group pressure 
is very much weaker unless it is coincidentaly based on ethnie affinity. 
As a conséquence of the weakness of this countervailing solidarity, 
much industrial conflict centres on whether a manager who is a member 
of a particular racial or ethnie group acted in an arbitary way towards 
another ethnicaly defined group. For example, in one récent case, the 
African labour force went one strike in support of the African personnel 
30
 See Michael CROZIER 'The Bureaucratie Phenomenon' Tavistock Publica-
tions, London 1964, pp. 220-4 for an extended discussion on the point with respect to 
France. 
31
 Ibid., CROZIER p. 222, 'The Arbitary Will of the Ruler'. 
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manager who was sacked by a predimonantly expatriate management. 
The other African supervisors and managers tried to stay aloof from the 
conflict since they were unsure of their interests in either group of 
combatant's position. 
THE STATUS OF TRADE UNIONS 
From its' colonial origins, Kenya has been characterised by its 
cultural diversity and social cleavage. At independence, it adopted a 
universalistic constitution but this did not, of course, alter existing 
between the différent ethnie segments which varied widely in size, 
wealth, institutions, social organisation and économie capacities. 
Whatever the formai gloss on the political System, in the absence 
of any strong cross-cutting loyalties, political power primarily developed 
from ethnicaly defined bases though with extensive popular support for 
the Président and a few other ministers. Since électoral constituencies 
correspond closely with ethnie geography, universal sufferage and a 
predominantly rural electorate has tended to re-enforce particularism 
in représentative institutions.32 However, as Smith argues, some 
central institutions nevertheless hâve to émerge in a pluralist society 
with superior authority and resources to prevent perpétuai sectional 
conflict. Since the différent subordinate sections are unlikely to accord 
equal value and legitimacy to the prevailing hiérarchie pattern, the use 
of power and authority become crucial for maintaining and controll-
ing the state.33 The struggle for political power and influence largely 
précèdes the accumulation of wealth since from it flows legitimacy 
for protecting the central institutions in the cause of national unity 
and needless to say, the position of the ruling clique. The distribution 
of the économie benefits available from the state in the form of loans, 
appointment to lucrative offices and so on then falls into the control 
of the same ruling group. 
Bureaucratie Systems of appointing office holders stress imperson-
ality and assume that a common set of values of dispassionate public 
service émerge from the structural pre-requisites of the organisation. 
However, given the fact that the différent ethnie groups from which 
thèse organisations draw their personnel, vary in number, territory 
and économie potential, there are inevitably considérable difficulties in 
establishing a balanced représentation in positions of power quite apart 
from outside political influence. Some groups will feel relatively disad-
vantaged vis à vis other groups. 
One way of consolidating a position in an organisation subjected 
to political control is to establish a patronage network that is verticaly 
32
 Hilary NG'WENO The 1974 Elections' Joe Election Review, 1974 p. 8. 
33
 M. G. SMITH 'The Plural Society in the British West Iridiés', University of 
California Press, 1965 and 'A Structural Approach to Comparative Politics' in David 
Easton, éd. "Varieties of Political Theory' Prentice-Hall, 1966, pp. 113-128. 
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organised on the basis of kinship. Through patron-client relationships 
from the top to the bottom of an institution it is possible to undercut, 
or at least be forewarned of any threats to the chief patron within. 
The importance of a particular patronage network is naturally dépendent 
on the amount of resources the patron controls and his own vulnér-
abilités to outside threats. Such a System of social organisation, Robert 
Tigre argues, was first introduced into Kenya by the British through 
the System of 'indirect rule' which relied on the appointment of 'chiefs' 
by the colonial administration. Thèse chiefs were expected to collect 
taxes from their kinsmen for their colonial masters in exchange for 
guns and administrative indulgence for the means they adopted.34 
A major social conséquence of clientelism, of considérable im-
portance for industrial relations, is that it results in little latéral social 
contact at lower levels in patron-client networks. Economie and 
cultural contact is ironically much more widespread between competing 
patrons occupying key rôles in government, the civil service, parastatal 
corporations, private companies and the army. Commenting on the 
factors inhibiting à working class consciousness developing in Kenya, 
Sandbrook observes: — 'Clientelism, emphasising vertical personal 
linkages, impedes the development of a consciousness of common 
interests on the part of an underlying strata. The underpriveleged, who 
are nearly equally affected by a lack of self-esteem are unlikely to 
follow the onerous path of rébellion, a collective class-based act, when 
the possibility of individual advancement and protection still 
exists. Clientelism offers, or seems to offer, a personal solution to 
the generic problems of exploitation and oppression. To the extent 
that clientelism vitiates class-consciousness among the underpriveleged 
and promotes intra-class rather than inter-class conflict, it is a support 
of the inegalitarian status quo. '3 5 
If Sandbrook is correct and clientelism is widespread in Kenya, 
it is yet one more factor contributing to economism and a calculative 
individualistic work philosophy. Conflict thus tends to occur between 
verticaly organised factions within organisations and revolves around 
differential access to power, it rarely has major policy or ideological 
implications. 
In so far as trade unions provide a rallying point for disaffected 
interests who feel relatively deprived in the distribution of political 
power, they pose a potential threat to the stability of the state by foster-
ing sectional, but noi class based, conflict. As Sandbrook points out, 
the labour movement is one of the few institutions in which non-Kikuyu 
hâve remained pre-eminent.36 Rather than repress the labour movement 
completely, the government has pursued a policy of incorporation of 
34
 Robert L. TIGNOR, 'Colonial Chiefs in Chiefless Societies' Journal of Modem 
African Studies, Vol. IX, No. 3, 1971 pp. 339-59. 
35
 Richard SANDBROOK 'Proletarians and African Capitalism: The Kenyan 
Case, 1960-1972' Cambridge University Press, London 1975 p. 21. 
36
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full-time officiais within a web of state patronage provided by législa-
tion that potentially guarantees their institutional and personal security. 
Most important is the encouragement of 'check-off arrangements by 
which employers collect and remit membership dues to union head-
quarters, fifteen per cent of which is sent on to the Central Organisation 
of Trade Unions.37 
Sandbrook notes: 
'Both stringent législation restricting the possibility of internai union 
opposition and state supervision of the internai process of unions may be 
used to enhance the personal security of incumbent officiais. If this strategy 
of isolating union leaders from rank-and-file pressures succeeds, it transforms 
leaders responsive to their members' aspirations into de facto public ser-
vants responsive to the 'public interest' as defined by the political authorities.' 3K 
The crucial patronage factor in législation affecting industrial 
relations, naturally, hinges on the willingness of the authorities to 
enforce codes of practice. As might be expected, may unions are espe-
cially vulnérable to the requirements of the Registrar of Trade Unions 
for properly audited accounts.39 At company level, there are also a 
range of indulgences that can be offered to trade union officiais, many 
of which may seem trivial to well paid union staff but not to branch 
officiais earning around $75 a month. 
Summarising our argument so far, it would appear that the social 
structure and political economy of Kenya is not condusive to the devel-
opment of strong autonomous trade unions able to engage in meaning-
ful collective bargaining. Vertical cleavages in Kenyan society are 
stronger than any cross-cutting occupational or class ties. Extrême 
disparities of wealth as a conséquence tend to encourage particularistic 
behaviour in both managers and workers rather than class-based antag-
onism. Some in positions of comparitive affluence hâve capitalised on 
the situation to establish personal networks of dependents who infor-
maly serve to protect their patrons interests. Security of regular employ-
ment is of over-riding importance, since from it flows the priveleges 
on which to build personal networks but it can never be entirely guar-
anteed because there are few checks and balances at the top.40 
37
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Muir and Brown's observation of the décline in strike activity in 
Kenya indicates to us a deepening of structural inequality and faction-
alism rather than wide acceptance of the System of compulsory arbitra-
tion. Times are good for organising trade union activity under condi-
tions of cultural pluralism only when there is some over-riding group 
to be opposed. Immediately prior to and after Independence this was 
the case where management was exclusively expatriate. The 'unity of 
négation', as Smith argues, is a highly unsatisfactory basis for assuming 
the long run moral solidarity and cohésion of an aggregation of cul-
tures.41 When management and government become Kenyanised, to 
make confusion more complète, many former labour leaders changed 
'sides' to join management or government. Unity of the central organs 
of power soon became a pre-requisite of political stability at the expense 
of other potentially autonomous groups, in particular, trade unions. 
Most labour leaders hâve, therefore, chosen incorporation into the 
networks of the ruling élite and spend their time organising their own 
factions within the labour movement to protect their power base and 
share of the union's income. 
Wage levels are set by management within government guidelines 
and formaly ratified by national union leaders. Union activity at the 
level of the firm as a conséquence is restricted to restraining arbitary 
managerial behaviour that threatens job security, thereby bolstering the 
préférences of companies which wish to appear as 'good corporate 
citizens' for highly bureaucratised employment policies. 
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